How do Chinese and Western media view China-Tibet relation?

Political and Religious System Before 1959

Before 1911: Emperor’s Symbolic Mandate and Dalai Lama's Actual Power

Tibet, a nation with a history stretching back nearly 2000 years, occupies the Himalayan Plateau in Central Asia. It physically separates China from the India [4]. For many centuries Tibet was an integral political entity, governed by the local religious leaders and feudal lords [3]. China invaded Tibet first in A.D. 650. The Great Fifth Dalai Lama died in 1680[1].  In 1720, a Qing army (Qing Dynasty, 1636 ~ 1911) invaded Tibet to expel other invaders. This event marks the beginning of Qing control over Tibet [2] and constant involvement of the Chinese in Tibetan affairs [1]. 

 

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Resource from http://www.seac.gov.cn/gjmw/zt/M226401050101index_1.htm
(Mural above describes 13th  Dalai Lama is visiting Qing Dynasty emperor, Cixi in 1908 in Beijing. )

Some scholars believe that principal symbol of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet was the office of the Residential Commissioner, known as the amban [1] as well as Qing's right to approve reincarnations [2] while others argue it is just a means Qing employed to limit the power aristocrat [2]. However, as the Qing Emperor admitted, ‘Tibetan local affairs were left to the willful actions of the Dalai Lama and the post of the Residential Commissioner in Tibet to name only.’[1] [5]For the most part of Qing's rule, Residential Commissioners were stationed in Tibet to maintain the Emperor’s symbolic mandate rather than to govern in fact [5]. To some extent, however, this state of affairs was acceptable to both sides: Qing preferred to maintain Tibet's semiautonomous status due to the difficulties in imposing direct administration; as long as the lamas were submissive and posed no threat, they would be tolerated[1][2]. 



However, as the nineteenth century unfolded, the Qing dynasty experienced pressing threats to its position both as a result of internal disturbance and external incursions by Western countries. Unable to pay much attention to Tibet, Qing's rule waned in Tibet gradually [2][5] . China - Tibet relation became more symbolic than real: although Tibet still offered respect to the Qing Emperor, it did not defer to amban in Lhasa.  By the nineteenth century, British and Russian, recognizing the importance of Tibet in trade and war, have both imposed some degree of influence in Tibet [5]. 


 



From 1911 to 1949: Shadows of Modernization

The overthrow of the Qing Empire by the Chinese revolution of 1911 created a quite new situation. A brief interval in 1910-1912 saw Lhasa under the military occupation of the Central Government of China, while the government has not exercised actual authority in Tibet. At the same time, China had been waging a ceaseless propaganda campaign within the international arena and was able to secure universal acquiescence for its sovereign rights over Tibet [1][6].  During this period, Tibetan authorities managed to resist every Chinese attempt to play an active role in the internal governance of Tibet, but failed to request international legal recognition of Tibet's independence [6]. 


The thirteenth Dalai Lama triumphantly returned to Tibet from exile in India in 1913. Facing the possibility of future hostilities with China, Dalai Lama urged modernization in Tibet, especially a strong army able to defend Tibet's interest. The reform also included setting up banks, mines and a postal service. Trade was promoted and students sent to study in the West. But the price of the reforms was deemed too high by the monastic elite [1] [5]. More importantly, equating modernization with Western atheism and secularism, the religious leadership believed it would diminish the power and importance of Buddhism. The conservatives tried to persuade Dalai Lama to move against the reform. By the mid-1920s, they had had succeeded [5]. 
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A picture of noble officers in old Tibet. Resource from http://www.chinatibetnews.com/zhuanti/node_3044.htm

From 1949 to 1959: From ‘One country, two systems’ to Tibetan Rebellion and the Dalai’s Flight

After the establishment of the PRC in October 1949, the new Chinese Communist government proclaimed Tibetan liberation as one of the main goals for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). At the same time, Tibet found himself in a very difficult situation. It was more isolated internationally than at any time since 1913 since British no longer had any interests in maintaining its “autonomous” status. Tibet sent appeals to USA and Great Britain, requesting civil and military assistance in the face of CCP threat. However, both countries discouraged Tibetans from expecting any aid [5]


Mao, the leader of CCP at that time, believed the best strategy was to liberate Tibet peacefully [1] [5] while the Military action was needed to force Tibet to the negotiating table [5]. Then the PLA troops crossed the Yangtse River and attacked the Tibetan troops defending the border [1][5]. 



The Tibetan government concluded that it had no choice but to send a negotiating delegation to Beijing and did so in the spring of 1951
[5]. “Seventeen-Point Agreement for peaceful liberation of Tibet”, the agreement signed in that meeting, officially ended the conflict over Tibet Question [1] [5]. It says that the traditional political-economic system in Tibet will remain intact until such time as the Tibetans wanted reforms. In the years immediately following the signing of the “Seventeen-Point Agreement”, Mao’s Tibet policy was one of gradualism. Military and administrative infrastructure should be developed but Chinese officers should not try to force reform [1] [5] [6]. 


The situation in Tibet, however, was growing increasingly turbulent, and the contradictions of the ‘one country, two systems’ approach ever more stark. Even the most trivial changes constituted a threat to the Tibetan upper classes and could cause major disturbance within such a highly traditional society
[1]


In 1957, a serf in Shannan was beaten up by his lord for failing to perform his ulag service—an unconditional duty, whose dereliction customarily received brutal punishment. In this instance, the victim was a CCP activist who had been assigned a cadre position at grass-roots level. The case became a touchstone for Party policy in Tibet. Gradually, Beijing realized that
if Tibetan peasants could not be won away from their traditional deference, they would inevitably side with their local rulers in any uprising against the CCP, and Beijing would never be able to ensure lasting sovereignty over the region [1]. 



[1]Reflection on Tibet, by Wang Lixiong, New Left Review 14, March-April 2002

[2] China's Tibet? : autonomy or assimilation by Warren W. Smith, Page 5 -16


[3]Tears of Lotus, by Roger E. McCarthy, page 16

[4] Undermining Tibet's Moral Claims, by Joseph Fallon


[5]The snow Lion and The dragon, by Melvyn C. Goldstein, page 21- page 53

[6]Communist China and Tibet, by Ginsburgs, page 5- page 43